Πρόγραμμα ομιλιών για το ακαδημαϊκό έτος 2025-26:

 21/10   Ιωάννα Μπαρτσίδη (Διδάκτωρ, Université Paris-Nanterre):  Αναζητώντας τον χαμένο Χέγκελ: Η εγελιανή φιλοσοφία στο έργο του Φουκώ

11/11   Κώστας Δημητρακόπουλος (Ομότιμος καθηγητής ΙΦΕ/ΕΚΠΑ):  ’Στοιχεῖα’ στα Αναλυτικά Ύστερα

2/12   Λεωνίδας Τσιλιπάκος (Senior Lecturer, Πανεπιστήμιο του Bristol):  «Αιτιακός καταλογισμός» στις ιστορικές επιστήμες

27/1   Θοδωρής Δημητράκος (Επίκουρος καθηγητής, Πανεπιστήμιο Πατρών):  Σχετικά με τον εξηγητικό ρόλο των νορμών στις κοινωνικές επιστήμες: μια φυσιοκρατική προσέγγιση

17/2 Aντώνης Αντωνίου (ERA Postdoctoral Fellow, Horizon Europe project: Andromeda, ΕΚΠΑ/ΙΦΕ):  Είναι η σκοτεινή ύλη ο αιθέρας του 21ου αιώνα;

2/3 (**13:30**) Daniel Andler (Professor emeritus, Sorbonne Université):  Is artificial intelligence headed for AGI?

24/3   Philipp Haueis (Department of Philosophy and Institute for Studies of Science (ISOS), Bielefeld University):  The conceptual fabric of science: Patchwork concepts and the dynamics of scientific understanding

21/4   Alkistis Elliott-Graves (Department of Philosophy, Bielefeld University):  Τι είναι η επιτυχία στην οικολογική αποκατάσταση;

5/5 (**18:00**) Teresa Robertson (University of California, Santa Barbara):  Origin Essentialism -How should we understand the view that an object’s origin is essential to its identity?

26/5   Robert DiSalle (Western University):Living in space-time
Abstract:
The relation between the formal geometry of space and human experience of space is one of the oldest problems in philosophy. This problem has seemed to become even more serious with the concept of space-time in the special theory of relativity. In introducing the concept, Hermann Minkowski
suggested that it is intuitively obvious. To later philosophers, however, the complex geometry of space-time appeared to stand in a more problematic relation to the space of experience, and the problem seemed to be further complicated by the general theory of relativity. An underlying problem, I argue, is a view of mathematical structure that obscured its connection with ordinary experience. This view was most explicitly advocated by the logical positivists, but they took their example from Einstein’s philosophical arguments for special relativity, and the implications of this view implications are still found in post-positive accounts. Its central assumption is that physical theories are essentially uninterpreted formal structures, requiring principles of interpretation to make genuinely synthetic claims about the empirical world. Einstein’s views, broadly speaking, reElected the inEluence and insight of Poincare and Hilbert regarding the empirical interpretation of mathematical structures. But his views also reElected a reductive form of empiricism, exempliEied by his argument that all geometrical measurements can be reduced to observations of “point-coincidences”. This approach placed emphasis on the role of experience in an epistemological account empirical content of theories, and away from its role in a scientiEic account of evidence for theories. When we examine experience in the latter role, as an evidentiary basis, we have a clearer view of the connection— as emphasized by Einstein— between physical theory and common sense. From this we arrive at a clearer view of the empirical signiEicance of general relativity, as a novel theory of space-time structure, and the nature of the evidence for this dramatic conceptual shift. This way of thinking may illuminate, not only the nature of space-time structure, but also the more perplexing mathematical structures introduced by quantum mechanics.